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IDEA 0154-67
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20 JAN 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Special Activities

SUBJECT: Feasibility of Relocation of IDEALIST
to Davis Monthan Air Force Base

1. The concept of moving the IDEALIST program to Davis Monthan AFB from Edwards AFB has been reviewed and the following comments are a result of that review.

2. Edwards AFB is basically a flight test facility and is well suited to IDEALIST operations because of the environment and isolated location. It also has a short runway that is not used for other aircraft. Davis Monthan AFB is a SAC/TAC operational base with an entirely different mission and at the present time their facilities are taxed to capacity. Because of this present saturation at Davis Monthan the relocation of the IDEALIST program would entail a complete rebuilding at Davis Monthan of all the expensive facilities which are already in existence at Edwards AFB. The cost of this new construction that would be necessary is estimated to cost [redacted] (See Tab I).

3. Assuming that there would be personnel replacements for those who would not move from Edwards AFB to Davis Monthan AFB, it would cost an estimated [redacted] people and the complete support mechanism and communications complex to Davis Monthan (See Tab II). In addition to the cost of the move there would be a detrimental impact on base housing.

4. Added to the huge costs that such a move would require, would be the costly delay in the test and delivery of the U-2R pending completion of construction of the necessary facilities at Davis Monthan AFB.

5. The security program of the CIA U-2 project would be seriously degraded by such a co-location for the following reasons:

a. A large group of Air Force people would have to be cleared on continuing basis due to their involvement in the support of daily operational and training requirements of the detachment U-2/U-2R aircraft.

USAF review(s)
completed.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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
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b. Uncleared personnel would also acquire project knowledge in U-2/U-2R versus SAC U-2, thereby seriously weakening, if not permanently damaging, the need-to-know principle. That access could result in the compromise of sensitive Agency systems and probably result in news media attention being directed at Agency activities.

c. An influx of Agency-civilian-contractor personnel would take place and their presence would be seemingly out of character on the DM flight line which is normally manned by USAF personnel. That civilian unit complexion would, by itself, be conspicuous.

d. Major differences in program activities such as SAC alerts, badges and civilian guards would only tend to highlight the contrast. Daily operating difficulties would ensue and our movements known.

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g. There would be a compromise of deployment security due to the large movement of personnel and material from the air base. A quiet operation is improbable.

h. In the event of loss to CIA aircraft and the civilian pilot on overflight, it could pose a serious contradiction to any political explanation offered by U.S. Government authorities.

i. By virtue of co-location with SAC aircraft of the same type, publicity originating from an overflight incident would result in the detachment being singled out by the public with erosion to cover story as well as the civilian character of the program.

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6. The conclusions noted in this letter are concurred in by Materiel, Research and Development, Comptroller and Security Staff of OSA.

7. For reasons of practicality, economy and security it is strongly recommended that the IDEALIST program remain at Edwards Air Force Base.

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Deputy for Operations, OSA

Attachments -
As stated

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SAS/OSA/pm(20 Jan 67)

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